



W WO OR RK KI IN NG G   P PA AP PE ER R   N NO O. .   2 24 44 4 
 
Perks as Second Best Optimal Compensations 
 
 












University of Naples Federico II 
 
University of Salerno 
 
Bocconi University, Milan 
CSEF - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance  
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS – UNIVERSITY OF NAPLES 
80126  NAPLES - ITALY 



















The finance literature views perks either as productivity enhancing expenditures or as a result of poor managerial 
control by shareholders. Using a corporate jet to attend a business meeting may be justified because of the 
returns generated for the firm; but flying on the same jet to reach a vacation resort reflects a misappropriation of 
the firm’s resources by the manager. Our paper challenges this view. We argue that complementarity between 
leisure and wages creates difficult incentive problems, because the bonuses or stock options that reward success 
increase the marginal disutility of effort. In such a context, we show that whenever there exist commodities 
(‘perks’) that are substitute to leisure (or even less complementary to leisure than money), the optimal incentive 
scheme involves overprovision of such commodities, in the sense that the agent should consume more of them 
that she would elect to, should she be given a choice between money and perks at the current market prices. This 
conclusion is valid even when perks must be provided independently of the manager’s performace. Finally, we 
discuss the role of governance by introducing manipulations a la Peng and Röell (2006), and show that, in 
contrast with standard intuition, perks are used even when governance is perfect, and poorer governance may 
result in less perks being offered to the agent. 
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 Perquisites, or ’perks’, are non monetary compensations that ﬁrms oﬀer
to select employees. They may include the personal use of chauﬀeur-driven
limos or executive jets, membership in select clubs, ﬁnancial counseling, tax
preparation and estate planning, retirement packages, etc. In many cases,
perks represent signiﬁcant amounts. A recent survey of the compensations
received in 2006 by several Silicon Valley’s chief executives1 indicates that
Larry Ellison, Oracle’s CEO, received almost two millions in ‘perks and other
compensations’; Meg Whitman (eBay) landed more than one million, and
several other CEOs received $500,000 or more. Moreover, perks are not ex-
clusive to CEOs; the same survey indicates that in several ﬁrms, the perks
received by other top executives (CFO, COO, SVP) are close to, and some-
times larger than those of the CEO.2 Nor is the perk phenomenon speciﬁc
of large, private corporations. Several universities provide faculty housing
below market prices; and a recent newspaper article reported that the Chan-
cellor of a top university charged its institution $11,000 in season tickets to a
theater. Finally, while some perks may seem largely related to business and
professional activities, other are not; some do not actually beneﬁt the exec-
1Equilar, Mercury News research, 2007
2For instance, Stephen McGowan, CFO and EVP of Sun Microsystems, received perks
for an amount of $922,830, more than the CEO.
3utive herself, but rather her family - examples include kindergarten services
or access to selective private schools, airplane tickets or use of company jet
f o rs p o u s eo rc h i l d r e n ,a n do t h e r s . 3
While the amounts spent on perks often represent only a small fraction
of the total compensation received by the beneﬁciaries, their mere existence
raises a simple question - namely, why not pay the corresponding amounts in
cash and let the employees free to purchase these products (or any alterna-
tive they may fancy) by themselves? Particularly intriguing is the fact that
most of the time, the corresponding products or services are unlikely to be
purchased by the agents (or at least not in the same amount), should they
receive the cash equivalent. This suggests that the utility derived from this
particular form of compensation may be quite small in regard of its cost -
3As an exemple, consider the following excerpt from an article published in the New
York Times:
"Some high school students will be making their way back to school
this week on a bus or, if they are lucky, in their own car. But the
stepdaughter of Edward Mueller, the new chief executive of Qwest Com-
munications, has a much fancier option....A regulatory ﬁling made Fri-
day, on the eve of the holiday weekend, disclosed that Qwest has au-
thorized Mr. Mueller’s wife and her daughter to use Qwest Corporate
jet to travel between Denver, where the telecommunications company is
based, and California, where Mr. Mueller’s stepdaughter is ﬁnishing
high school. [...] Asked about the ﬁling by the Rocky Mountain News,
a Qwest spokesman said the agreement reﬂects an appreciation for his
family situation as his daughter wraps up her schooling in California".
New York Times, September 4, 2007
4therefore that perks are, at least in a ﬁrst best world, a particularly ineﬃcient
(and distorsive) way of paying compensations.
In the ﬁnancial literature, the standard explanation of perks relies on some
formof agency problem; namely, perks are used by managers to (mis)appropriate
some of the surplus generated by the ﬁrm, in a way that is neither approved
nor even acknowledged by shareholders. Cash transfers, while more eﬃcient,
would be more visible, hence less useful in terms of surplus extraction. In
short, perks are the consequence of poor monitoring of the managers by the
shareholders - a view that lies at the core of a host of theoretical papers in
corporate ﬁnance.4 This interpretation, however, has recently be challenged
by Raghuram Rajan and Julie Wulf (2006). In their paper, Rajan and Wulf
use a large database on executive compensation to carefully examine the
empirical relevance of several predictions generated by the standard agency
model used in most of the corporate ﬁnance literature. Overall, they ﬁnd
little support for it. For instance, they ﬁnd no direct relation between gover-
nance and perks, nor any impact of exogenous changes in governance on perk
consumption; and they show that standard indicators of external monitor-
ing, such as board size, fraction of outside directors or institutional investor
4See for instance Grossman and Hart (1980), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Jensen (1986)
and Aghion and Bolton (1992).
5ownership, are unrelated to perks used for personal purposes. They tellingly
conclude that despite ‘occasional aberrations, [...] treating perks purely as
managerial excess is incorrect’.
Alternative justiﬁcations for perks have been suggested. For instance
perks may in some case allow to exploit tax loopholes. This argument helps
explaining some but not all perks, in particular because the tax advantage
has to be traded oﬀ with the utility loss linked with the in kind provision of
less desired commodities.5 Rajan and Wulf, on the basis of their empirical
analysis, suggest still another explanation: ﬁrms oﬀer as perks goods that
increase workers’ productivity. Such a direct provision is eﬃcient because
managers’ private incentives to consume perks fall short of their ‘social’ in-
centives whenever ﬁrm can appropriate part of these productivity gains6.
This intuition has been formalized in a recent paper by Marino and Zabo-
jnık (2008). In their setting, perks serve as a nonlabor input that increases
the agent’s productivity. They show that perks are generally oﬀered even
5Rajan and Wulf ﬁnd that state marginal tax rates have a statiscally signiﬁcant impact
on the use of company car, country club membership and ﬁnancial counseling. However,
the use of chauﬀeur and corporate jets is not signiﬁcantly linked to state taxes. More-
over, recent, increased pressure from the IRS to declare perks as taxable income did not
signiﬁcantly reduce the use of perks over the corresponding period (Rajan and Wulf 2006).
6Noteworthy, this explanation seems to implicitly refer to a moral hazard problem :
were it possible to pay a manager conditional on its true eﬀort, a worker would have
appropriate incentives to consume productivity enhancing commodities
6when their direct consumption beneﬁts are oﬀset by their costs, and derive
c o m p a r a t i v es t a t i cr e s u l t s .
The Rajan/Wulf/Marino/Zabojnık argument can justify some of the perks
actually observed, from the provision of a laptop to the availability of the
company jet for business-related travel. However, it applies only insofar as
the perks actually increase the agent’s productivity; it precludes any purely
private (non business-related) consumption of perks. Advantages like ﬁnan-
cial counseling, retirement packages, or private use of the corporate jet - let
alone kindergarten, private schools or family use of the corporate jet - can
hardly be justiﬁed by their impact on the agent’s productivity. Therefore,
in the traditional view, their existence can only be the by-product of some
kind of managerial misconduct.
In this paper, we propose an alternative and complementary justiﬁca-
tion for perks that challenges traditional wisdom. Speciﬁcally, we argue
that in a context of asymmetric information, perks are typically part of the
(second-best) optimal incentive scheme even when they have no impact on
the agent’s productivity. Firms may rationally want to pay perks that are
not directly productive, because such a compensation reduces the cost of
providing adequate incentives to the employee. The basic idea is that, in
7general, an agent’s utility depends on eﬀort (or leisure) and consumptions
in a non separable way. Non separability of leisure and consumption is a
standard ﬁnding of the empirical literature on labor supply (see for instance
Browning and Meghir (1997)). It reﬂects the very natural intuition that, in
general, the marginal utility of leisure increases with wealth, if only because
number of consumable goods (travel, services,...) are complements of leisure;
for instance, a free week-end is both more expensive and more enjoyable
when spent skiing down Colorado slopes or sailing along the coast of some
Caribbean island rather than idling in Brooklyn.7 Non separability between
eﬀort and consumption is moreover a standard conclusion in the recent lit-
erature on CEO compensation. Several patterns of executive compensations
(e.g., the negative relationship between the CEO’s eﬀective equity stake and
ﬁrm size, the positive correlation between the respective volatilities of the
ﬁrm’s value and the manager’s wealth, or the fact that the dollar change in
7AB e c k e r i a nj u s t i ﬁcation, used for instance by Bennardo and Chiappori (2003), relies
upon the existence of a domestic production function that produce some agent-speciﬁc
commodity, using time and the consumption good as complementary inputs. In this case,
the marginal utility of consumption typically increases with leisure. To see why, assume
that well-being is proportional to the consumption of a single household good ξ,p r o d u c e d
from some constant return to scale technology :





where φ is increasing concave. Then ∂2v
∂c∂e =
∂2f
∂c∂e is always negative.
8wealth for a percentage change in ﬁrm value, scaled by annual pay, is inde-
pendent of ﬁrm size) are incompatible with preferences that are additively
separable in eﬀort and consumption, while they directly stem from models us-
ing a multiplicative (therefore non separable) speciﬁcations, as demonstrated
by Edmans, Gabaix and Landier (2008).
In the moral hazard setting we consider, complementarity of leisure and
consumption has a crucial consequence8; namely, direct compensations, in
terms of (performance-related) cash payments, tend to increase the disutility
of eﬀort, which exacerbates moral hazard issues. At the very high income
level reached by many top executives, the (marginal) value of leisure is so
high (and the marginal utility of money so low) that providing adequate
incentives becomes extremely costly; moreover, such incentives, by further
increasing the subjective cost of activity, may even be counterproductive, a
case illustrated by Bennardo and Chiappori (2003).
We investigate the consequences of this remark from a second best per-
spective, in a multicommodity setting. A standard second best analysis
concludes that the optimal contract typically involves consumptions pat-
8The implications of non separable preferences for moral hazard problems were initially
recognized by Grossman and Hart (1983). For a recent and more thourough investigation,
see Bennardo and Chiappori (2003)
9terns that are distorted vis a vis both the ﬁr s tb e s ta n dt h ea g e n t ’ su n -
constrained choices, in order to fully exploit the diﬀerent complementar-
ity/substitutability properties of each commodity with respect to leisure.
Speciﬁcally, we show, in a simple model in which the agent can consume
leisure, a numeraire good (‘money’) and a third commodity, the ‘perk’, that
if the perk good is a substitute to leisure, in the (usual) sense that con-
sumption of the former decreases the marginal utility of the latter, then the
second best optimum entails a larger consumption of perks than what the
agent would freely select. Moreover, the conclusion holds under weaker as-
sumptions; actually, one only needs perks to be ‘less complement to leisure’
(in a sense we precisely deﬁne) than the numeraire.
One can easily accept that giving a top executive access to a corporate
jet to facilitate her professional travels could be eﬃcient. We argue, however,
that the conclusion may extend to private use of the jet, insofar as it can be a
substitute for alternative uses of the agent’s time. When she wants to reach
Aspen for a ski week-end, a top executive faces a choice between leaving
her oﬃce early on Friday afternoon in prevision of the long hours required
for the connections between regular ﬂights, or attending this crucial but late
meeting on Friday evening and taking next a direct ﬂight on the company jet.
10Here, access to the private ﬂight on Friday night reduces the marginal utility
of leisure; in a second best context, this property should be exploited to
provide incentives optimally. By the same token, saving an employee’s time
by providing her with adequate assistance in tax preparation, estate planning
or ﬁnancial counseling will generally be eﬃcient, even if the consumption of
these services is purely private and does not directly increase her productivity
in the oﬃce. On a less fancy tone, availability of subsidized housing located
near the campus reduces the time academics spend commuting; it is thus
second best eﬃcient in general.
A second conclusion is that if, as argued above, leisure and money are
complement, then the optimal compensation plan will entail overconsump-
tion of the perk good whenever the latter is ‘less complementary to leisure’
than money, in a sense we precisely deﬁne. In particular, even if the agent’s
utility is separable in leisure and perks, so that consumption of perks has no
impact on the marginal disutility of eﬀort, one still expect overprovision of
perk at the optimum whenever leisure and money are complement, precisely
because perks alleviate the negative impact of high wages on the cost of pro-
viding adequate incentives. In all these cases, the optimal incentive scheme
requires that a fraction of the compensation be paid as perks. A regulation
11reducing or prohibiting the use of perks would actually directly harm share-
holders and result in social losses. A third conclusion is that when the non
separability eﬀects are not too strong, better paid managers (i.e., more pro-
ductive managers or managers supplying their services in more competitive
labor markets) receive a larger fraction of their compensation in the form of
perks.
Our basic model can be extended in several directions. The second best
eﬃcient allocation of perks can, alternatively, be implemented by the intro-
duction of subsidies over perk goods. We also consider the coexistence of
several perk goods, and show that the basic intuition can be generalized: if a
commodity, say i, is less complement to leisure than some other commodity,
say k, then commodity i is ‘more overconsumed’ than commodity k at the
optimum, in the sense that given the total expenditures on goods k and i,
the agent would like to consume more good k and less good i than provided
at the second best. Our basic intuition is also remains valid whether the
provision of perk can depend on the state of the world or not; even when
incentives cannot be provided by additional perks expenditures rewarding
good performance only, perks are still overconsimed at the second best. Fi-
nally, we discuss the links between our second-best explanation of perks and
12governance issues. While in our story perks are not directly caused by lack or
governance, it is nevertheless the case that the provision of perks may, in the
same second best spirit, be used to alleviate governance problems. We illus-
trate this general idea in a simple extension of our model, the main features
of which are borrowed from Peng and Röell (2008). We show that, indeed,
severe governance problems may impact the optimal allocation of perks. The
conclusions, however, are quite diﬀerent from the standard insights. Not only
a r ep e r k sp r e s e n te v e nw h e ng o v e r n a n c ei sp e r f e c t ,b u to n ec a nﬁnd robust
examples in which more serious governance problems may result in less perks
being provided at the optimum.
The related literature includes the seminal contribution of Grossman and
Hart (1983), which was the ﬁrst, to the best of our knowledge, to consider
the eﬀects of non separability of preferences on second best rewards schemes.
Bennardo and Chiappori (2003) show that when the agent’s preferences are
non separable in eﬀort and consumption, Bertrand competition may result
in positive equilibrium proﬁt for perfectly competitive principals. Our pa-
per is an extension of theirs to a multi-commodity setting, but in a partial
equilibrium environment. Peng and Röell (2008) assume non separable pref-
erences to investigate the eﬀects of managerial manipulation of performance
13measurement and characterize second best contracts in a single good en-
vironment. Jensen (1986), a representative of the conventional corporate
ﬁnance literature on perks, argues managers working for ﬁrms generating
larger cash-ﬂow get larger perks, while ﬁrms with better external governance
pay less perks in the spirit of Jensen and Meckling (1976). Yermack (2006)
empirically investigates the link between perks and external governance. He
ﬁnds that the disclosure of a CEO’s personal use of a company plane leads
to underperforming average shareholder returns.
Section 1 describes basic setting. Section 2 provides basic results with
comparative statics. Section 3 discuss extensions of subsidized perks, several
perks and state independent perks. Section 4 analyzes the eﬀect of gover-
nance structure on perks. Section 5 concludes.
1 The Model
We consider a simple, principal-agent model in which a risk-neutral principal
(the ﬁrm or its shareholders) maximizes expected proﬁt while dealing with
a risk averse agent (the top executive). When employed by a principal, an
a g e n tp r o d u c e sa no u t p u tt h a tc a nt a k et w ov a l u e sY and y,w i t hY> y .T h e
14probability of achieving the high output Y depends on some unobservable
eﬀort level e. We assume for simplicity that eﬀort can take only two values,
eL and eH,w i t heH >e L; the ‘good’ outcome Y obtains with probability
P (e),w h e r eP (eH)=P and P (eL)=p<P.
There are three commodities in this economy: leisure l, a numeraire good
(‘money’) c a n dat h i r dc o m m o d i t y ,q, which we call a perk; we deﬁne ‘ef-
fort’ e =1− l. We ignore price variations, and normalize both prices to
one. Note that, in this simpliﬁed setting, any compensation received by the
a g e n tt h a td o e sn o tt a k et h ef o r mo fap e r ki su s e dt oc o n s u m et h ea l t e r n a -
tive commodity. In other words, the (state-dependent) consumption of the
numeraire good can be seen as a reduced form for any ‘standard’ type of
outcome-related payment; these includes wage and bonuses, but also stock
options or any sophisticated compensation.
In our analysis, the complementarity or substitutability between leisure
on the one hand and consumption goods on the other hand plays a crucial
role. To emphasize these aspects, we assume that an agent’s VNM utility
function has the form
u(c,q,l)=v(c,l)+w(q,l) (1)
15so that we can ignore complementarity or substitutability between money and
perk. The crucial aspect, which directly generalizes Bennardo and Chiappori
(2003), is that eﬀort is not separable from consumption of the numeraire
good; i.e., the marginal utility of leisure (or equivalently the marginal disu-









which depends on both consumptions.
To keep the discussion more intuitive, we ﬁrst assume that leisure and
consumption of the numeraire are complements while leisure and perks are
substitute (equivalently, that eﬀort and money are substitutes while eﬀorts




























It must however be stressed that these assumptions, while natural, are
signiﬁcantly stronger than what we need. Our results simply require that
perks be ‘less’ complementary to leisure than the numeraire is, in the follow-
9A particular case is the multiplicative form used by Edmans, Gabaix and Landier
(who do not consider perks). Indeed, if, following these authors, we assume that
v = cg(e)
where g is decreasing, then
∂2v
∂c∂e














for all (c,q). When leisure and consumption of the numeraire are comple-














a n de q u a t i o n( 3 )i ss a t i s ﬁed; but, obviously, (3) is much less restrictive than
(2).
2 Optimal incentive-compatible contract
2.1 The main result
In what follows, we consider only deterministic contracts; i.e. we exclude ran-
domization both ex ante (whereby agents face a lottery of possible contracts)
and ex post (whereby each agent, contingent on his outcome realization, re-
ceives a lottery of possible payments). The interested reader is referred to
18Bennardo and Chiappori for a detailed discussion of these issues. Let (C,Q)
(resp. (c,q)) denote the agent’s consumption vector when the high (low) pro-
duction level is achieved. One can for instance think of c as the agent’s basic
wage, and of C −c as the bonus paid in case of success. Alternatively, C −c
can be the value of the stock options received by the agent (assuming that the
strike is such that they are exercised only in the good state of the world), or
the capital gain made by the agent on the stocks she owns. Throughout the
paper, we assume that the technology is such that the second best optimum
entails provision of the high eﬀort by the agent: incentives are worth being
used.
The optimal incentive-compatible contract maximizes the principal’s ex-
pected proﬁt, subject to a participation constraint for the agent and the
incentive compatibility constraint. The program is thus (assuming the high
eﬀort level is implemented):
maxPY +( 1− P)y − (P (C + Q)+( 1− P)(c + q))
under the constraints
P (v(C,1 − eH)+w(Q,1 − eH))+(1 − P)(v(c,1 − eH)+w(q,1 − eH)) ≥ ¯ U
19and
P (v(C,1 − eH)+w(Q,1 − eH)) + (1 − P)(v(c,1 − eH)+w(q,1 − eH))
≥ p(v(C,1 − eL)+w(Q,1 − eL)) + (1 − p)(v(c,1 − eL)+w(q,1 − eL))
where ¯ U is the agent’s reservation utility.
Let us ﬁrst consider the ﬁrst best contract (i.e., the optimal contract
if eﬀort was contractible). It entails full insurance for the agent; i.e., the
compensation package (c,q) does not depend on the output realization. Re-













In words, the individual’s MRS between the two types of consumptions equals
their relative price. Therefore the ﬁrm does not need to directly cover ex-
penditures on perks; it may as well pay a global wage equal to C + Q in
the high output case and c+q otherwise, and let the agent freely choose her
consumptions on the spot market. We conclude that in the absence of moral
hazard, perks should not be part of the compensation package.














































where λ and µ are the respective Lagrange multipliers of the participation
and the incentive compatibility constraint.
































































































We can therefore state the following result:
Proposition 1 If condition (3) is satisﬁed, then the optimal second best
contract is such that the perk good is overconsumed, in the sense that the
marginal rate of substitution between money and the perk good is larger than
the corresponding price ratio.
In words, the optimal contract is such that the marginal utility of money
is strictly larger than that of perks: the agent would, from an ex post per-
spective, prefer to consume less perks and more of the numeraire good. In
22particular, should she receive her entire compensation as a monetary wage,
the quantity of perk she would buy would be smaller than the second best
quantity. Therefore, eﬃciency requires perks to be provided in kind, in excess
of the quantity the agent would freely purchase on the market. Not surpris-
ingly, perks are usually luxury goods, which even wealthy executive would
not buy in large quantities by themselves.
In practice, our framework encompasses a number of special cases. One
is the company plane example described above. Here, the perk (access to a
company plane) is a direct substitute to leisure. Even if the agent’s utility is
separable in leisure and money (i.e., v(C,1 − e)=¯ v(C)+¯ u1−e))-s ot h a t
ah i g h e rw a g ed o e snot increase the marginal disutility of eﬀo r t-t h eo p t i m a l
contract still entails overprovision of perks because perks, by reducing the
agent’s disutility of eﬀort, lower the cost of providing adequate incentives.
Alternatively, if money and leisure are indeed complements in the agent’s
utility function, then any commodity that can be consumed without (too
much) increasing the disutility of eﬀort can be used as a perk, and the second
best optimum entails overprovision of it. It is tempting to think of symbolic
gratiﬁcations, status or positional goods in these terms. A larger oﬃce,
the availability of a private chauﬀeur, membership of an exclusive club are
23signals that convey important information about the person’s status within
the organization.10 To the extent that they do not increase disutility of eﬀort
(and one could actually argue that, if anything, they reduce it), they should
be part of the optimal compensation package.11
2.2 Comparative statics
In general, moral hazard models with non separable preferences do not gen-
erate clear-cut comparative statics properties. If however, we restrict our at-
tention to situations in which the non separability eﬀects are not too strong12
(i.e., if we perform our comparative static analysis ‘in the neighborhood of
separability’), several results can be demonstrated13 First, when the agent’s
reservation utility ¯ U increases, then both her monetary wage and the amount
of perks she receives increase. If, moreover, perks are luxury goods in the
10As noted by Rajan and Wulf, the signal is all the more credible that the total supply
of such signals is limited. ‘There are only so many corner oﬃces or so many places on
the corporate jet, and who gets them can signal the recipient’s place in the pecking order
better than cash compensation can’ (Rajan and Wulf, 2006, p. 6).
11This intuition is well expressed by Rajan and Wulf: ‘If relative standing within the
ﬁrm is an important element of the utility derived from compensation (see Frank, 1985a,b),
then perks can motivate far more cost-eﬀectively than equivalent amounts of cash.’ (2006,
p.6).
12These are situations in which although perks are used at the second best solution, their
optimal level remains small with respect to the monetary incentives - which ﬁts pretty well
observed data.
13Formal proofs are available from the authors uponn request.
24usual sense, then the fraction of total compensation paid as perks increases
as well. In short, better paid agents receive proportionally more perks - a
ﬁnding that is consistent with the ﬁndings of Rajan and Wulf. Secondly,
perks should be larger for more productive managers, and also for managers
supplying their services in more competitive markets. Moreover, if the prob-
ability p of a low eﬀort being undetected is larger, then the amount Q of
perks paid if the outcome is high must increase; however, the amount q paid
in the alternative situation may either increase or decrease, so that the over-
all impact is indeterminate. The (somewhat counterintuitive) conclusion is
that although perks, in our model, are used to alleviate moral hazard prob-
lems, more severe moral hazard may not result in more perks being oﬀered
on average. Our model generates a more subtle prediction - namely that
when moral hazard issues are more stringent, the level of perks rewarding
good performance should be higher.
253 Extensions
3.1 Subsidized perks
The model can readily be extended in several directions. First, the mere
notion of perks implicitly relies on an exclusivity assumption, in the contract
theory sense; i.e., it must be the case that the principal can monitor the
agent’s consumption, and in particular impose a consumption of perks larger
than the amount the agent would have freely chosen. While this assumption
makes sense in our speciﬁc context, it is not indispensable. In the absence of
exclusivity, the optimum could still be implemented using subsidies; it would
then require a lower monetary wage compensated by a subsidized access to
perk goods. To see how, just note that the previous program characterizes
the marginal rate of substitution between perks and the numeraire for each
outcome realization. This MRS is larger than one, implying that the agent,
if facing the market prices, would voluntarily purchase less perks than the
second best amount. If, on the other hand, perks are subsidized so as to
equate the price ratio to the second best MRS, then the agent’s compensation
m a yb ep a i di nn u m e r a i r e-s h ew i l ls p e n dt h eo p t i m a la m o u n to np e r kg o o d s .
Note, however, that the second best outcome requires a subsidy that varies
26with the outcome; in other words, the agent’s bonus in case of success is partly
paid by giving her access to more subsidized perks. In that sense, providing
agents with subsidized meals at the ﬁrm’s cafeteria can be an eﬃcient perk.
3.2 Several perks
A second extension is related to the case when several perks goods coexist.
Assume that there exist n commodities that can be used as perks, and let
us disregard issues linked to complementarity/substitutability between perks





If the marginal utility ∂wi (qi,l)/∂qi is large enough when qi goes to zero,
the program leads to the following:
∂v(C,1 − eH)/∂C




















We conclude, again, that all perk that are substitute to leisure (or less
complement to leisure than money, in the sense deﬁned above) are overpro-
vided at the optimum. An interesting consequence is that for any two perk
27commodities (i,k),w eh a v et h a t :
∂wk (Qk,1 − eH)/∂Qk




















If commodity i is less complement to leisure than commodity k,i nt h e
sense that
∂wk (Qk,1 − eL)
∂Qk
−
∂wk (Qk,1 − eH)
∂Qk
>
∂wi (Qi,1 − eL)
∂Qi
−
∂wi (Qi,1 − eH)
∂Qi
then
∂wk (Qk,1 − eL)/∂Qk
∂wi (Qi,1 − eH)/∂Qi
> 1
and commodity i is ‘more overconsumed’ than commodity k at the optimum,
in the sense that given the total expenditures on goods k and i,t h ea g e n t
would like to consume more good k and less good i than provided at the
second best.
3.3 State independent perks
In the previous analysis, perks are used, together with money, to reward
eﬀort. As a consequence, the level of perks depends on (and actually increases
28with) the outcome; the implicit assumption being that it is indeed possible
to vary the level of perks in response to the agent’s observed performance. A
more complex but sometimes more realistic situation occurs when the level
of perks is either not ﬂexible or has to be decided ex ante, i.e. before the
outcome can be observed (say, because it aﬀects the marginal disutility of
eﬀort only if consumed when the eﬀort is actually performed). Then the
agent’s consumption of perks must be the same in all states of the world;
in particular, the principal cannot use variations in the amounts of perks
provided to create additional incentives. However, the previous conclusions
are still valid: the optimal contract involves overprovision of perks, in the
sense that should the manager receive, before the outcome is realized, a cash
amount equal to the value of the second best optimal level of perks, she would
have purchased less perks.
To see why, consider the second best program, which is now:
maxPY +( 1− P)y − PC− (1 − P)c − Q
under the constraints:
Pv(C,1 − eH)+( 1− P)v(c,1 − eH)+w(Q,1 − eH) ≥ ¯ U
29and
Pv(C,1 − eH)+( 1− P)v(c,1 − eH)+w(Q,1 − eH)
≥ pv (C,1 − eL)+( 1− p)v(c,1 − eL)+w(Q,1 − eL)
where Q denotes the (state-independent) level of perks.
First order conditions give:
P
vc (C,1 − eH)
= λP + µ
µ
P − p
vc (C,1 − eL)
vc (C,1 − eH)
¶
(1 − P)
vc (c,1 − eH)
= λ(1 − P)+µ
µ
(1 − P) − (1 − p)
vc (c,1 − eL)
vc (c,1 − eH)
¶
1
wq (Q,1 − eH)
= λ + µ
µ
1 −
wq (Q,1 − eL)
wq (Q,1 − eH)
¶
The ﬁrst two equations imply
P
vc (C,1 − eH)
+
1 − P






vc (C,1 − eL)
vc (C,1 − eH)
+( 1− p)
vc (c,1 − eL)




vc (C,1 − eL)
vc (C,1 − eH)
+( 1− p)
vc (c,1 − eL)
vc (c,1 − eH)
> 1 >
wq (Q,1 − eL)
wq (Q,1 − eH)
30we conclude that
P
vc (C,1 − eH)
+
1 − P
vc (c,1 − eH)
<
1
wq (Q,1 − eH)
which, since the function 1/x is strictly decreasing and convex, implies that:
Pvc (C,1 − eH)+( 1− P)vc (c,1 − eH) >w q (Q,1 − eH)
In words: if the agent was given, ex ante (before the state of the world
is realized), a given amount of cash to be allocated between perks and the
numeraire, the optimal choice would be such that the above relationship is
satisﬁed as an equality; therefore the second best does involve overprovision
of the perk.
4 Perks and Governance
In our model, lack of governance is not the main culprit for the existence of
perks - moral hazard is. It does not follow, however, that perks are irrelevant
for governance issues. To the extent that governance problems involve moral
hazard - as they usually do - the provision of perks can, and will at the
31optimum, be used to alleviate these problems. We shall illustrate this claim
using a simple extension of our model that closely follows the technology
introduced by Peng and Röell (2008). We therefore assume that, in addition
to her productive eﬀort, the agent can inﬂuence the principal’s evaluation
of her performance by undertaking a set of activities, ranging from devoting
time and eﬀort to develop a network of relations to any kind of creative
accounting aﬀecting her division’s books. The crucial idea is that these
activities are not beneﬁcial to the principal (for instance, they do not increase
the long term value of the stock) but may increase the agent’s compensation
(for instance because it is based on short term performance). One may
think, for instance, that the agent’s reward is based on a signal (say, end of
year value of the stock) which is available before the realization of the true
outcome (the long term value), and is only imperfectly correlated with it.
The explanation of this divergence between the agent’s payoﬀ and the ﬁrm’s
(long term) interest is a standard theme of the ﬁnancial literature (see for
instance Bolton, Scheinkman, Xiong 2006), that we do not address here.14
We therefore assume, following Peng and Röell, that the agent chooses
14A more complex but probably more interesting setting would involve three players -
the agent, the principal and the market - and allow for richer interactions between them
- for instance, the principal may sometimes collude with the agent, whose manipulations
may deceive the market. This is the topic of ongoing research.
32two types of eﬀort. One, denoted e as above, is productive and has a direct
impact on the probability of reaching the good outcome. The other, denoted
a, is a manipulation that has no impact on the long term output but may
aﬀect the interim signal on which the agent’s reward is based. Formally, P,
which is now interpreted as the probability of receiving the positive signal,i s
a function P (e,a) of two variables; and utilities depend on both eﬀorts, i.e.
v(C,1 − f (e,a)) and w(Q,1 − f (e,a)) where f (e,a), the cost of choosing
the pair (e,a),i si n c r e a s i n gi ni t st w oa r g u m e n t s .N o t et h a tn o wt h ep r i n c i p a l ,
while still willing to promote the productive eﬀort e,w o u l dh o w e v e rl i k et o
discourage manipulation, which increases expected costs without beneﬁts.
Finally, we maintain the assumption that e can take only two values, eH >e L,
and we similarly assume that a ∈ {aL,a H} with aH >a L;a n dw es i m p l i f y
the notations by posing
P = P (eH,a L),P
0 = P (eH,a H),p= P (eL,a L),p
0 = P (eL,a H)
As before, p<Pand p0 <P 0;a n dP0 ≥ P and p0 ≥ p, expressing the fact
that manipulation works.
In this setting, the quality of governance is inversely related to the dif-
33ferences P0 − P and p0 − p. If governance is perfect, both numbers are zero,
reﬂecting the impossibility of successful manipulations; and an increase in
these diﬀerences can be interpreted as a worsening of governance.
A complete characterization of the relationship between governance and
optimal level of perks is quite complex, and the conclusions generally depend
on the parameters of the model. We shall simply emphasize two points,
both of which go against the standard intuition that poor governance results
in higher perks. First, if governance is ‘good enough’, manipulation is not
a problem. The optimal contract is then the same as before, and involves
perks. In other words, even under perfect governance, we expect the optimal
contract to entail perks. The second point is more surprising. Start from a
context of perfect governance (in which P0 = P and p0 = p), and gradually
increase the severity of the manipulation problem up to a point at which
the initial contract is no longer incentive compatible. Then the second best
contract has to be adapted to deter incentives to manipulate. In such a case,
the optimal response may consist in reducing the perks. In other words,
not only are perks compatible with good governance, but a deterioration of
governance may optimally reduce the level of perks oﬀered by the contract.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider the case of state-independent perks.
34To get the intuition of the ﬁrst result, note that the optimal contract now
involves three incentives constraints, namely:
P (v(C,1 − f (eH,a L)) + w(Q,1 − f (eH,a L))) (8)
+(1− P)(v(c,1 − f (eH,a L)) + w(q,1 − f (eH,a L)))
≥ p(v(C,1 − f (eL,a L)) + w(Q,1 − f (eL,a L)))
+(1− p)(v(c,1 − f (eL,a L)) + w(q,1 − f (eL,a L)))
P (v(C,1 − f (eH,a L)) + w(Q,1 − f (eH,a L))) (9)
+(1− P)(v(c,1 − f (eH,a L)) + w(q,1 − f (eH,a L)))
≥ P
0 (v(C,1 − f (eH,a H)) + w(Q,1 − f (eH,a H)))
+(1− P
0)(v(c,1 − f (eH,a H)) + w(q,1 − f (eH,a H)))
P (v(C,1 − f (eH,a L)) + w(Q,1 − f (eH,a L))) (10)
+(1− P)(v(c,1 − f (eH,a L)) + w(q,1 − f (eH,a L)))
≥ p
0 (v(C,1 − f (eL,a H)) + w(Q,1 − f (eL,a H)))
+(1− p
0)(v(c,1 − f (eL,a H)) + w(q,1 − f (eL,a H)))
35The ﬁrst constraint expresses the fact that, in the absence of manipulation,
the agent prefers taking the high level of productive eﬀort. The second im-
plies, conversely, that when choosing the high productive eﬀort, the agent
does not try to manipulate. Finally, the last constraint states that the com-
bination high productive eﬀort - no manipulation is preferred over low pro-
ductive eﬀort with manipulation. Now, if P0 = P and p0 = p, manipulation
has a cost (for the agent) but no beneﬁt; the agent will therefore never choose
aH. In practice, (8) implies (10) and (9) is always satisﬁed. By continuity,
t h es a m ec o n c l u s i o nh o l d si f(P0,p 0) is ‘close to’ (P,p).
Regarding the second point, for the sake of brevity we simply provide
an intuitive argument; a complete example is available upon request. Start
from a situation in which (P0,p 0) is ‘close to’ (P,p), so that the second best
contract can be implemented without manipulation risk, and increase (P0,p 0)
up to the point where the second best contract is no longer implementable,
because it would induce some manipulation from the agent. The contract
must therefore be modiﬁed so as to reduce the incentives to manipulate, but
without killing the incentives to choose the productive eﬀort. This requires
a change in the mix of incentives devices (bonus C − c and perks q) used
to provide incentives to the principal. In practice, the principal may either
36oﬀer a larger bonus and less perks or reduce the bonus and increase the
perks; indeed, increasing both the bonus and the amount of perks would fail
to deter manipulation, while reducing both the perks and the bonus would
discourage the agent from exerting the productive eﬀort. One can then check
that if the manipulatory and the productive activities are substitutes (in the
sense that P0 − P<p 0 − p), then reducing perks may be the only way to
satisfy the constraints simultaneously.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The ﬁnance literature views perks either as productivity enhancing expen-
ditures or as a result of poor managerial control by shareholders. Using a
corporate jet to attend a business meeting may be justiﬁed because of the
returns generated for the ﬁrm; but ﬂying on the same jet to reach a vacation
resort reﬂects a misappropriation of the ﬁrm’s resources by the manager. Our
paper challenges this view. We argue that complementarity between leisure
and wages creates diﬃcult incentive problems, because the bonuses or stock
options that reward success increase the marginal disutility of eﬀort. In such
a context, we show that whenever there exist commodities (‘perks’) that are
37substitute to leisure (or even less complementary to leisure than money), the
optimal incentive scheme involves overprovision of such commodities, in the
sense that the agent should consume more of them that she would elect to,
should she given a choice between money and perks at the current market
prices. Such perks can proﬁtably be used for pure incentive purposes even
when they generate no productivity gains.
Clearly, our story complements other explanations. There is little doubt
that, in some situations, aberrant perks may signal managerial excess and
surplus misappropriation, or can be simply explained by a desire to exploit
tax loopholes. In other cases, perks directly increase the employee’s pro-
ductivity. It is interesting to note, in particular, that most of the empirical
ﬁndings of Rajan and Wulf support both our explanation and the produc-
tivity enhancement story. For instance, they ﬁnd that executives are more
likely to be granted access to a corporate plane when local airports are small
and poorly connected; obviously, these features increase the value of the
plane both in terms of a productivity-enhancing tool and of a substitute to
leisure. Empirical distinction could probably be established by comparing
the consumption of perks by top executives of large, public ﬁr m sv e r s u ss e l f -
employed entrepreneurs, since the moral hazard issue is reduced in the letter
38case.
What out results suggests, however, is that perks may deserve a more
careful investigation. A crucial aspect is the impact of the corresponding
consumptions on the marginal disutility of eﬀort. From a general perspec-
tive, our message is pretty straightforward: if, in the deﬁnition of executive
compensations, moral hazard is an important issue, then the (second best)
outcome will generally require overprovision (or subsidization) of any com-
modity that is a complement to the ‘eﬀort’ under consideration. Throughout
t h ep a p e r ,w ea d o p tas p e c i ﬁci n t e r p r e t a t i o no fe ﬀort in terms of time spent
working, and we accordingly emphasize the consumption/leisure trade-oﬀ.O f
course, alternative interpretations of the notion of eﬀort are possible. Our
main point is valid from a fully abstract perspective; the only requirement
is that, whatever the speciﬁct y p eo f‘ e ﬀort’ one has in mind, the perks at
stake are actually complement to it (or at least less substitute than cash).
For instance, if the main issue is avoiding excessive risk taking by the man-
agers, then any consumption that increases the agent’s risk aversion should
be subsidized. We nevertheless believe that our leisure interpretation is a
natural and relevant one. Although most top executives work long hours,
problems linked with insuﬃcient labor supply (in the most usual sense) are
39not unheard of;15 and the marginal value of a CEO’s time is arguably so
high that even ﬁf t yo rs i x t yh o u r sw e e k sm a yn o tb es u ﬃcient in some cases.
Moreover, that most CEOs work much does not mean that they don’t need
incentives to do so, but rather that adequate incentives are actually provided
by their current reward packa g e ,a n dp r e s u m a b l yi na ne ﬃcient way, i.e. at a
minimum cost. Our results suggest that cost minimization is likely to entail
the provision of perks, which is what we observe in practice.16 At any rate,
while assessing complementarity or substitutability between any given perk
and managerial eﬀort is a challenging, empirical task, we nevertheless believe
15The following example is quite interesting in this respect:
‘During 10 critical days of this crisis — one of the worst in the securities
ﬁrm’s 84-year history — Bear’s chief executive wasn’t near his Wall Street
oﬃce. James Cayne was playing in a bridge tournament in Nashville, Tenn.,
without a cellphone or an email device. In one closely watched competition,
h i st e a mp l a c e di nt h et o pt h i r d .
As Bear’s fund meltdown was helping spark this year’s mortgage-market
and credit convulsions, Mr. Cayne at times missed key events. At a tense
August conference call with investors, he left after a few opening words and
listeners didn’t know when he returned. In summer weeks, he typically left
the oﬃce on Thursday afternoon and spent Friday at his New Jersey golf
club, out of touch for stretches, according to associates and golf records. In
the critical month of July, he spent 10 of the 21 workdays out of the oﬃce,
either at the bridge event or golﬁng, according to golf, bridge and hotel
records.’
The Wall Street Journal online edition, November 1, 2007
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119387369474078336.html
16In our model, eﬀort is discrete, so that incentives simply guarantee that the eﬀort
provided is maximum. While the discrete eﬀort assumption is a simpliﬁcation, it is in line
with the recent literature, which argues that even when eﬀort is continuous, it is often
eﬃcient to set it at its maximum level (see Edmans et al 2008).
40that further work is needed in this direction.
F i n a l l y ,w em a ye x p e c tt h ec o m i n gy e a r st op r o v i d es o m en a t u r a lt e s t s
of the various explanations at stake. In a 2006 report, the Security and
Exchange Commission, while refusing to deﬁne the term "perk" because of
its elusiveness, recommended more restrictive disclosure rules; in particular,
all perks worth more that $10,000 should be publicly declared by ﬁrms. The
agnostic position of the regulatory agency seems quite appropriate in light of
our results. More interestingly, if the traditional explanation of perks by the
corporate governance literature - private appropriation is less visible, hence
easier through perks than through wages, bonuses or stock options - is correct,
then perks should all but disappear once they have to be publicly declared.
If, on the contrary, perks are indeed an eﬃcient productivity-enhancing or
incentive device, then we should expect that they will mostly be maintained
in the long run. Interestingly enough, while similar (although more lenient)
disclosure requirements were implemented in 1993, they seem to have had
little impact on the use of perks.17 From this perspective, the next future
17‘One might imagine that perks have come under increased scrutiny with additional
SEC disclosure requirements and pressure from the IRS to declare perks as taxable income.
With the caveat that our data do not allow us to distinguish between business and personal
use, we ﬁnd little variation in perks over the period in our sample.’ (Rajan-Wulf 2006, p.
14).
41should be quite informative.
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